Posted in BP British Petroleum,Deepwater Horizon,Florida Maritime News,Government,Gulf Coast,Louisiana Maritime News,Maritime Accidents,Maritime Law,Texas Maritime News,US Coast Guard (USCG),World Maritime News on September 14, 2011
NEW ORLEANS, La. – The Joint Investigation Team (JIT) investigating the Deepwater Horizon disaster has issued its final report on the incident and has made it public on Sept 14, 2011. The JIT is composed of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
The purpose of the JIT, as stated on its official website is “to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon MODU explosion and loss of life on April 20, 2010.
According to the JIT document, the Final Report of Investigation contains the findings, analyses, conclusions, and recommendations of the JIT.
Volume I, released April 22, 2011,covers the areas of investigation under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard; it includes findings on five aspects of the disaster under Coast Guard jurisdiction – including the explosions on the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Deepwater Horizon; the resulting fire; evacuations; the flooding and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon; and the safety systems of the MODU and its owner, Transocean. The Coast Guard’s Final Action Memo details actions directed by Adm. Papp, as a result of the JIT’s work, reflecting the Coast Guard’s commitment to all of those affected by this tragic yet historic event and underscoring its commitment to the stewardship of our maritime environment.
Volume II includes findings on the causes, both direct and contributing, of the Macondo blowout and the resulting explosion and fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon. In Volume II, the JIT details evidence developed during the investigation and concludes that BP, Transocean and Halliburton’s conduct in connection with the Deepwater Horizon disaster violated a number of federal offshore safety regulations under BOEMRE’s jurisdiction. Volume II also includes recommendations for the continued improvement of the safety of offshore operations.
Each volume was prepared according to the respective agency’s internal processes and complements the other. Together, they provide a comprehensive assessment of the incident. The two volumes comprise the completed joint Report of Investigation.
1. The investigative team issued a preliminary report of its findings on April 22, 2011 which was, at that time, designated to be the final report. However, an addendum to the final report was issued by the forensic analysis firm, Det Norske Veritas. Det Norske Veritas was hired by the government to determine why the blowout preventer (BOP) failed leading to the massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Their report was entitled “Addendum to Final Report” and was published eight days later on April 30, 2011.
2. After the “Addendum to Final Report” was made public, the original final report was then reclassified as a “preliminary report”, and the JIT has continued its investigation to make sure that “all evidence is properly weighed and considered.” The JIT has posted on its website the announcement that the original report did not represent “final agency action” and that it would be taking more time to finalize the report.
3. The Final Deepwater Horizon Report dated September, 14, 2011 is now available for download from the website of the Joint Investigation Team.
The Coast Guard received comments to their investigation and report by Parties in Interests (PIIs), some of which we will point out:
1. We take issue with one of the conclusions by the JIT which states that even though BP (British Petroleum, Plc) was responsible for the readings of a second pressure test which it determined was successful, and therefore indicated that the cement job was satisfactory. JIT also concluded that Transocean personnel were present and aware of the tests. We take issue with this conclusion because we wish to point out that the Transocean personnel present were the oil rig workers aboard the Deepwater Horizon who were killed in the explosion and therefore are unavailable for comment on this point.
2. The Coast Guard also received a comment which places the timing of events in dispute in regards to the alarms on the bridge control panel. The events in dispute were made in a statement by Mr.[REDACTED]. The Coast Guard states that it took the statement into consideration, but disagrees with the comment.
Our Position on the operation of a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) is that because it is a moving vessel and not a stationary platform, it should be commanded by a captain and not by oil company managers. We believe that rules should be put in place that would require all such vessels be U.S. flagged and under the more stringent USCG guidelines. We feel that part of the problem with the Deepwater Horizon was that it was a foreign-flagged vessel (registered in the Marshall Islands)
We feel that the MODU captain should be responsible for both the navigational and industrial functions of the vessel because it is a moving vessel and command of a vessel is best done by the captain.
Maritime attorneys, Gordon & Elias, L.L.P. work with Jones Act clients all along the Gulf Coast and throughout the nation. We are the leading offshore injury law firm representing victims of the BP, Transocean Deepwater Horizon disaster, along with assisting businesses that were damaged by the impact of the Gulf oil spill. For a free consultation, call an expert maritime lawyer 24/7 at 800.773.6770.
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