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August 18, 2010

James Lucari
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James Neath
Associate General Counsel
BP America, Inc.
550 Westlake Park Blvd.
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Dear Messrs. Lucari and Neath:

As the owner and operator of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, BP has in its sole possession a significant amount of key information about the well, including real-time data collected by BP at its Houston Office, documents, logs, cementing and operational reports, and seismic data that are critical to identifying the cause of the tragic loss of eleven lives and the pollution of the Gulf of Mexico. BP's post-incident reports revealed that this data was maintained; however, it has not been provided to Transocean, either before or after the incident.

On behalf of Transocean, we write to make at least the seventh request for certain BP data, some of which was requested as early as May 12th, listed below, in the hope that this might finally produce a fair and timely response from BP.

We are unable to understand BP's continued refusal to provide documents in response to our outstanding requests—documents that only BP has and that are critical to an honest assessment of the incident and the identification of possible improvements for the entire industry. Since the incident and over the course of the last several months representatives of Transocean have—on numerous occasions—requested BP's forthright cooperation in producing this information so that our internal investigation can be conducted and completed in a comprehensive fashion. Yet, despite Transocean's prompt and transparent production of information requested by BP, BP has continued to demonstrate its unwillingness, if not an outright refusal, to deliver even the most basic information to Transocean. This is troubling, both in light of BP's frequently stated public

commitment to openness and a fair investigation, and because it appears that BP is withholding evidence in an attempt to prevent any entity other than BP from investigating the cause of the April 20th incident and the resulting spill.

BP records will confirm that a second formal request for information related to the ongoing investigation was made on May 15, 2010, when Transocean's counsel sent your company an email summarizing the data to which Transocean never had access and asking under what conditions BP would produce the requested information. In that correspondence, we suggested:

We would like to immediately agree that any document produced by the companies with any Congressional or other state or federal governmental bodies be simultaneously produced to the other **Can we agree on this small step immediately?** (Emphasis in the original.)

After weeks of delay and limited responses to our data requests, and before BP would produce any further information, you informed us that BP required Transocean to sign a Confidentiality Agreement, promising that Transocean keep all BP information secret. Transocean believes in a fair and transparent investigation and, accordingly, Transocean made no such demand of BP. Ultimately, and despite our reservations, we agreed to BP's condition of secrecy because there is no other source of key well data, and we were confident that the information contained in these documents would further our investigation as well as those being conducted by a host of state and federal governmental authorities.

Transocean has continued its requests to BP to be open and transparent, with the hope that BP shared our commitment to allowing everyone to discover the truth and to make improvements for the entire industry. Our most recent appeal to BP was on August 16, 2010, in which we rather stridently reminded you that BP's continued refusal to cooperate was "seriously hampering" Transocean's and other investigations and adversely impacting our ability to inform state and federal investigators and the families who lost loved ones as to the factors that contributed to the April 20th incident.

Although BP has produced some documents, BP has not produced a single document since **June 21st**, or even acknowledged receipt of our requests since August 3rd, even though BP has all such information at its fingertips apparently and is using it selectively internally and with other investigating agencies.

Without access to the BP data listed below, the task of fairly determining the cause and measures to improve the safety of all offshore workers cannot be completed in a manner that instills confidence in any findings. We once again appeal to BP to provide Transocean with the following list of documents, reports, and data logs.

We thank you in advance for your time and attention to this matter and stand ready to provide any further descriptions or to send someone to BP's office to discuss the scope of each request and obtain the information sought.

Summary of and Explanation for Outstanding Information Requested:

1. Records of BOP pressure tests using the Digital Testing Method for this well.
[This is a new method of performing BOP tests and, to our knowledge, is not used outside of BP.]
2. MMS approval for using the Digital Test Method for this well with the *Deepwater Horizon*.
[Again, this is a new method of performing BOP tests and, to our knowledge, is not used outside of BP.]
3. ASCII data file from Halliburton.
[All data should be provided in a format from which the raw numbers can be readily obtained for independent calculations. Previously data has been received in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format. We would also like the data as provided to BP by Halliburton during operation.]
4. Lab report and tests: We have lab tests for April 12, 2010, but some evidence suggests that subsequent tests were performed. We need all of the lab tests for this casing interval.
 - Lab report of tests run with actual well site samples to confirm slurry design.
[The data on these standard tests is needed for several reasons. There may have been contamination during transportation. There may be differences in the cement blend for the as-shipped cement. Third, evidence suggests that BP and Halliburton were still deciding upon the final cement additives that affect setting time between the 16th – 18th of April, and final tests should be available on samples to verify setting time and strength of the actual cement used in the cement job.]
 - Lab foam stability tests.
[The data is needed to understand whether the foam had sufficiently high stability to prevent break out of free nitrogen. Foam stability analysis is a standard laboratory test performed on foam cement slurries. It is important to understand the stability level as break out of free nitrogen could negatively impact the cement slurry density and decrease its performance.]
 - Spacer/cement and spacer/mud compatibility testing.
[This data is needed to understand any impact of the interface between these fluids with respect to rheological properties and any impact on pumping/setting times, and the possible impact upon the functioning of sensors.]
 - Rheological details of cement slurries, spacer, base oil and drilling fluid.
[The data is needed to confirm rheological properties in order to flow model and account for frictional pressures.]

5. As-run casing tally with accessories and details:

- Casing centralizer make, model, specifications and placement.
[This data is needed to calculate the effective stand-off and model flow pattern and potential cement channeling. Casing centralization models require the effective stand off force for the centralizers. The placement in the casing string is also necessary in order to properly model the casing centralization geometry and potential for cement channeling.]
- Float shoe, float collar, cross-over and casing hanger placement.
[The data is needed to confirm the locations of the float equipment, cross-over centralizer.]
- Data books for the top and bottom cementing plugs and sub sea release (SSR) tool used. Detailed information on the plugs is needed to evaluate the risk of fluid bypass during displacement and pressure testing.

6. Halliburton's execution (job) report of cementation including slurry and spacer formulations, pump pressure, density, slurry pump rate, whether the cement was batch mixed or on-the-fly mixed, corresponding N₂ pump rate and pressure, and the record of injection rate of the foaming agent and stabilizer.

This should all have been recorded from start of pumping spacer, cement mixing, addition of N₂, and displacement to bumping plug.

[This data is needed to confirm post job analysis.]

7. Lab report of any post job tests that presumably were done in this case from cement samples taken during the job.

[This data is needed to confirm post job analysis.]

8. Drilling mud reports for same period as drilling reports.

[These reports are needed to confirm the mud properties at the time of the cement job (e.g., density, gel strength, and viscosity) for modeling purposes.]

9. Gas composition (as a percentage by volume or percentage by mass of each constituent gas) and flow rate.


[The data is needed for modeling gas migration and combustibility.]

10. Volumetric flow rate at the surface.

[The data is needed for modeling gas migration.]

11. Gas temperature prior to ignition.
[The data is needed for modeling gas migration and combustibility.]
12. Details of prior wells abandonment procedure and condition.
[The data is needed to verify deviation, if any, from prior abandonment procedures.]
13. Drilling the well on paper report.
[The report is needed identify BP's operating concerns prior to drilling the well.]
14. Shore based logs.
[The logs are needed to confirm transfers of material and personnel to the Deepwater Horizon.]
15. BP organization chart for the Deepwater Horizon support team.
[The chart is needed to identify key personnel.]
16. Amendments and/or modifications to BP's temporary abandonment and riser displacement procedures, including any communications related thereto.
[The data is needed to verify the actual procedures and the changes from the original plan.]

Sincerely,



Steven L. Roberts
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Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc.

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